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Identifying an Agenda for a new Eastern Policy
During the last decade the European Union has been an important player in rela-
tions throughout Eastern Europe, including Russia. Extending membership to
eight Central European countries was not only one of the biggest success stories of
European integration but also secured the countries’ domestic transitions.
Considering the common economic and security interests of Russia and the
European Union, both sides have made some important steps toward creating a
common framework by signing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and
the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia. Since the European Commission agreed on
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), relations with Ukraine, Moldova and
the Caucasus have received an extended European perspective, even if the ENP
does not offer the membership prospects that those countries expected. The
European Union has some potential to be a driving force in Eastern policy. At the
same time however recent domestic developments within Eastern Europe have
become more dynamic and less predictable. The neighbouring countries oscillate
between democratic leaps forward, as indicated by the “Rainbow Revolutions” in
Georgia and Ukraine and increasingly authoritarian regimes in Belarus or
Turkmenistan. Russia’s use of energy and other mechanisms to compensate for its
declining influence as a superpower profoundly affect domestic politics in the
region, which continues to be plagued by shortcomings in economic moderniza-
tion and remains without attractive partnership offers from both East and West.
Beginning with Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” in 2003 and continued by Ukraine’s
“Orange Revolution”in 2004, a democratic wave broke in the neighbouring coun-
tries. The domestic developments have been marked by similar patterns. Obviously
falsified elections gave the starting signal for a democratic opposition and a civil
society to demand free and fair elections that mirrored Western values. The civic
protest in Ukraine and Georgia were much stronger than Western analysts and
decision makers, who had criticised the absence of freedom of the media and
democratic pluralism, ever could have assumed. Apparently almost overnight these
long-time extensions of Russian power turned into self-confident, attractive
European countries. The newly democratically elected governments have been try-
ing to close the gap between transition deficit and Western orientation. Before the
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The ENP as part 
of the EU agenda
latest breakthrough, the ENP countries already declared EU membership to be one
of their foreign policy priorities, but did not make the necessary commitments to
domestic change and did not decrease their dependence on Russia.
The “Rainbow Revolutions” most unexpectedly changed the ENP agenda: The
European Union has been challenged to implement a two pronged approach, guid-
ing transition while integrating the ENP countries into Euro-Atlantic structures. If
it fails the Union runs the risk of losing regional influence to the Kremlin. Yet the
reality that followed this feast of democratic change is more complicated. Beyond
the democratic breakthroughs of free and fair elections, freedom of the media and
a new spirit of transition, Georgia and Ukraine so far have not succeeded in imple-
menting a clear-cut transition strategy. Both transition processes suffer short-
comings in their reform teams and broad-based political parties. Tbilisi almost has
no opposition to president Saakashvili, while Kyiv lacks a government capable of
acting. During this challenging period of transition, the EU is losing its advantage
by not being able to offer the desired prospects of membership. At the same time,
Russia is poisoning the European relations by using trade embargos and energy
dependence as a mechanism of maintaining post-Soviet hegemony.
Expectations towards German EU presidency for shaping a new Eastern policy are
high. The ENP agenda has to be upgraded to an attractive as well as realistic
approach, binding the neighbouring countries on their awkward path of domestic
transition and Western orientation. The official Belarus, as a neighbouring country
that neglects almost every European standard and option for cooperation, is a par-
ticular challenge, an assessment that might also apply to Central Asian countries
with authoritarian governments. The priority of the Union’s relations with Russia
is an engagement targeted on reducing the gap between joint interests and differ-
ent values, retaining Russia as a reliable supplier of energy and regional security,
while also bearing in mind that a democratic Russia would be of the highest
European interests. In other countries belonging to the former Soviet Union, the
European Union is challenged to open a new strategic debate on the situation
within the region as well as on related European interests. The latest EU-Russia
summit in Helsinki showed that joint action in a European Union of 25 and more
member states has become more complicated, and national interests threaten to
undermine the European agenda. To further reduce the risk of gridlock, while
allowing innovative approaches the necessary room for manoeuvre, shaping and
making a new EU Eastern policy requires new procedures.
An attractive European Neighbourhood Policy
The most positive result of the European Neighbourhood Policy has been the re-
lated agenda-setting. There can be no doubt that ENP constitutes a crucial part of
the European external affairs agenda. However, a substantive evaluation requires
an assessment of how effective the ENP has been at fulfilling the goals set for it by
the Union. The ENP is dedicated to creating a “ring of friends”consisting of coun-
tries bordering the European Union. From a geographic as well as a political per-
spective, it is necessary to differentiate between an agenda for Eastern Europe and
a Mediterranean agenda. The political situation and challenges faced by the EU in
the Eastern European neighbourhood are a consequence of the latest big bang
enlargement, which granted membership to eight Central European countries in
2004 that all sustain close relations and strategic alliances with their neighbours
Overall goal: security
and stability beyond
the EU’s borders 
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further east. Very often bilateral relations, for instance between Poland and
Ukraine, were also pursued with the goal of tilting the political balance against
Russia. Among these countries, Moldova and Ukraine are in a transition process
aimed at becoming Western-style market democracies, and are attempting to use
European integration as means of measuring their development. Considering their
growing strategic significance and potential for democratic change, the European
Commission decided to broaden the ENP agenda to include Georgia, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, while in the Mediterranean, the ENP agenda has been limited to the
interests of southern EU member states of preventing migration and maintaining
an internal balance of European integration.
In principle, the ENP opens a broad spectrum of functional cooperation in all four
areas of European integration: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capi-
tal and people. This approach would potentially include implementing free move-
ment from Lisbon all the way to Lugnask. Beyond functional cooperation, how-
ever, the ENP does not offer any kind of institutional tie that differentiates this
approach from the strategic option of membership. Nevertheless, the interests are
quite similar to the interests related to membership. The European Commission
has declared its support for security, stability and prosperity beyond the Union’s
borders through strengthening cooperation, having a positive impact on the solu-
tion of regional conflicts, and supporting the transition to democracy and a market
economy. Common values, strengthening political dialogue, economic and social
cooperation, increased trade relations, as well as cooperation in the field of justice
and home affaires are the blueprint of the ENP. Beyond this general approach, the
ENP is conceived to find tailored solutions to the particular requirements of each
country concerned by drafting and implementing country analyses and country
strategy papers. Without going into much detail, it seems obvious which short-
comings the country action plans entail. For instance, the Ukrainian action plan
was adopted December 9 2004, at the very moment when the “Orange Revolution”
in initiated a new wave of democratic transition dedicated to European values. The
democratic opposition in Ukraine, supported by a large amount of civil society
activism fulfilled the major proportions of the ENP action plan which contained
priorities on democratic values and demanded free and fair elections, freedom of
the media and a strong civil society. Once the “Orange Revolution” had produced
a giant step forward for this agenda, the ENP was not able to produce further
guidelines, which might have aided in maintaining democratic transition beyond
the first decisive step of free and fair elections. Without offering prospects for
membership, the European Commission is currently not able to offer a master plan
for shaping transition.
At its inception, the ENP was not allocate separate funding, but was instead based
on other budgetary resources. Between 2000 and 2003 1332.2 million EUROs were
allocated by TACIS, covering Eastern Europe, and 3716.1 million by MEDA, financ-
ing the ENP in the Mediterranean. Starting with the new 2007-13 EU budget, the
ENP will have its own dedicated budget. While the overall amount of money is
projected to be increased by 35 percent, the balance between the two regions
remains the same. Approximately 70 percent of the resources are targeted at the
Mediterranean and 30 percent at Eastern Europe. In contrast to the overall strate-
gic framework of the ENP, Russia also is part of the ENP budget, but is not part of
the monitoring processes which tracks the implementation of European interests
or action plans.
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Prioritising the Mediterranean
Lack of conditionality
Concentration on the EU
Benefits and shortcomings of the ENP
The most important benefit of the ENP remains the related agenda-setting:
Asymmetries between the European Union and its neighbouring countries, which
strive for, but still struggle with, achieving democracy and Western value, are no
longer being ignored. Apart from its generally positive development however, the
ENP continues to suffer some shortcomings, which mostly originate from the
approach’s lack of attractiveness for the neighbouring countries concerned, in par-
ticular for those in Eastern Europe.
1. Lack of differentiation
The ENP lacks differentiation between an Eastern European agenda, aimed at the
new neighbours that have the potential to join the European Union, and a
Mediterranean agenda targeted at keeping the internal balance of European inte-
gration. Putting both agendas in the same strategic basket neglects the different
preconditions of cooperation, interests, regional conflicts and framework condi-
tions. From the perspective of the neighbouring countries, combining both areas
has led to disappointment, as they perceive the EU to be ignoring their orientation
toward Europe. Consequently, the ENP has only enjoyed reduced attractiveness
from the start. Budgetary planning and spending 70 percent for the Mediterranean
neighbours confirms a certain regional priority, which does not correspond with
the pressure from Central and Eastern Europe. The country action plans are an
important step towards better approaching specific regional requirements but are
not flexible enough to take into account fundamental changes such as the Orange
Revolution in Ukraine, which rendered the action plan obsolete immediately.
2. Limited attractiveness
From a strategic perspective, the absence of conditionality is the biggest weakness
of the ENP. In shaping its external relations, the European Union currently faces a
deadlock. It suffers from integration crises, in particular from the failure of the EU
member states to ratify the constitution treaty. It appears neither interested nor
willing to apply the tool of continuing enlargement, regardless of the domestic
state of affairs in the ENP countries. The ENP is dedicated to implementing the
acquis in the neighbouring countries, but does not offer the necessary institutional
incentives. As a consequence, the ENP not only remains limited in its influence in
shaping the transition process in the neighbouring countries, but also limited in its
attractiveness, so as long as the Commission does not show interest in applying a
conditionality approach.
3. Neglect of regional integration
In its substance, the ENP concentrates on bilateral cooperation between the
Commission and the neighbouring countries, neglecting cooperation on the re-
gional level. Developments in the Balkans demonstrate that stability beyond the
Union requires regional cooperation. Concentrating external relations solely on
the European Union might have a negative impact on relations among neighbour-
ing countries. Again, one can hardly imagine creating a regional identity that
unites both agendas of the ENP, the East European and Mediterranean.




ENP is not an alternative
to enlargement 
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4. Failure to deal with authoritarian regimes
The ENP does not offer an approach for interacting or dealing with authoritarian
regimes and is only of limited use as a strategy for supporting regime change. Even
though supporting democratic transition might be in the European interest, the EU
does not have a strategy applicable to overcoming isolation or self-isolation of
authoritarian regimes. The Union could, for instance, offer increased cooperation
with the democratic opposition and contacts with Europe at all levels outside re-
gime structures. Belarus, which directly borders the European Union, is the most
challenging case for the ENP.
5. Disregard for the Russia factor
Russia has a strong interest in shaping the European neighbourhood as well. So
far, the Kremlin has used personal contacts, energy dependence and trade rela-
tions to maintain its influence on the successor states of the former Soviet Union,
which are also perceived in Russia as “the near abroad”. Issues such as the
Kaliningrad question, reliable energy supply and secessionist conflicts in Moldova
and Georgia demonstrate that problems in the ENP countries cannot be solved
without considering Russian interests. As long as Russia either shows disregard or
disinterest of European values, such as democratic standards and human rights,
the country will remain a difficult partner. Nevertheless, the Kremlin is too impor-
tant a regional stakeholder for the ENP to ignore any conclusion or link of EU-
Russian relations for its own agenda.
6. Deficient coordination among European institutions
The ENP suffers from some problems of inconsistency because from the outset on
it was not clear whether the strategy should be part of an enlargement agenda or
the EU’s common foreign policy. The Commission switched ENP responsibility
from the Directorate-General Enlargement to the DG External Relations. As a poli-
cy covering the agenda of “non-membership”, some competencies are also assig-
ned to the Council. This unclear division of responsibility, between Enlargement
and External Relations shows a significant dilemma of the ENP: to have to use
instruments of enlargement policy but avoid any institutional commitments.
The entire ENP agenda has been driven, first and foremost, by those EU member
states with direct external borders that are interested in avoiding a new dividing
line. It has also been driven by concerns about strengthening the balance of power
among Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia. On the one hand, individual
EU member states such as Poland, Slovakia or Lithuania are important driving for-
ces in pushing the ENP agenda forward; on the other hand, substantial progress
on the European level can only be achieved by building far-reaching alliances.
Overall assessment
The ENP does not offer a realistic and attractive approach to fulfilling the strategic
goals that have been identified by the European institutions: preventing a new divi-
sion in Europe, strengthening security and improving stability in the neighbouring
countries. After two years of experience with implementing the ENP, a critical assess-
ment indicates that the policy is not an alternative for enlargement and does not
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Debating Europe’s future
Requirement for a
new strategic decision  
Focus on Eastern Europe
strengthen the EU’s strategic position as a global player intent on narrowing the
strategic gap between Russia and the West. Overall, the shortcomings of the ENP are
related to the absence of a strategic vision. The ENP can be interpreted as a mixture
of EU instruments based on technical assistance (MEDA; TACIS) that also uses the
mechanisms of enlargement, but does not offer the necessary institutional commit-
ments that would make the decisive difference. The unclear focus of the ENP is
reflected by the huge and non-homogeneous regional focus that combines Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean and to some extent even Russia.
Overcoming the strategic gap would first and foremost include a debate about the
future of Europe. As long as the European Union cannot overcome its fatigue con-
cerning integration and enlargement, the toolbox that the EU can offer its neigh-
bours will be reduced to a “neighbours of Europe” approach, guided by coopera-
tion, and not a “European neighbours”approach, targeted at integration.
The latest proposals from the Polish, Lithuanian and German foreign offices, and
last not least, the Communication from the European Commission on strengthen-
ing the ENP clearly indicate that EU member states and the European institutions
are still eager to develop the ENP. As a consequence of Germany’s traditional func-
tion as a driving force of Eastern policy, key actors from Eastern Europe as well as
other advocates of good neighbourhood relations are pushing Germany to put the
issue on the foreign policy agenda for its EU presidency. To make a new strategic
decision on how to shape polices beyond the EU’s borders, it is also necessary to
consider that failing to offer an attractive approach would deprive the EU of an
opportunity to have an impact on stability and security in states directly bordering
the EU, which would burden EU member states as well weaken the Union’s posi-
tion as a global player.
Steps toward a policy of European neighbours
1. A policy for European partners
Overstretch within the geographic reach of the ENP can only be reduced by con-
centrating on those countries directly bordering the European Union that are cur-
rently undertaking a transition dedicated to European values. Implementing this
goal would not mean annulling the ENP but would rather signify the introduction
of a regional differentiation between Mediterranean and Eastern Europe, putting
the focus on the latter. The traditional driving forces for a new Eastern policy
should also consider the particular interests of the southern EU member states.
They should emphasise the benefits of this specific approach for Europe as a whole
and simultaneously point out the risks of neglecting the political imperative
coming from Eastern Europe. Implementing a new Eastern policy successfully also
has to be considered with relation to the budget. 70 percent of the ENP budget
dedicated to the Mediterranean agenda does not reflect an Eastern Europe priori-
ty. To reduce the financial and strategic gap, additional funding from EU member
states and international financial institutions should be considered.
To signal a strategic change, the Union should use terms of a more inclusive cha-
racter to overcome the perception that “West”and “East”are synonyms for “in”and
“out”or “member”and “non-member”of the European Union.
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Freedom of movement
Engaging a “Black Sea Union”
Bypassing authoritarian
regimes
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2. Tailored application of the acquis communautaire
There is not much of an alternative to considering membership as the long-term
goal of a new Eastern policy, even if currently neither the European Union nor
even the most democratic, and therefore European, neighbouring states are ready
for such a step of European integration. The European Union should openly
address the substantial length for any future accession process while at the same
time offering attractive alternatives aimed at institutional integration.
Assessing the debate in the neighbouring countries demonstrates that orientation
towards the EU is, to a large extent, a foreign policy goal dedicated to increasing
emancipation from the Kremlin. In the countries’ domestic agendas, the EU has
become a symbol for “Europe”as such and for the related values of prosperity, free-
dom of movement, democracy and the rule of law. If a membership perspective
cannot be offered, the EU should work on a new concept of European integration.
Particular emphasis should be put on implementing the parts of the acquis commu-
nautaire that are attractive for both the neighbouring countries and the European
Commission. Emphasis should be put on the freedom of movement by facilitating
the Schengen acquis, while simultaneously strengthening cooperation in the area
of justice and home affairs.
3. Supporting regional cooperation
As long as EU membership is not a realistic option, integration has to be support-
ed by other mechanisms. Today the potential for regional cooperation to create sta-
bility and security cannot fully be tapped into, as demonstrates the situation of
Black Sea cooperation. Facilitating free movement of peoples, decreasing trade
barriers and creating common institutions oriented toward European integration
can be sustainable contributions to regional well-being. The European Union
might assist in establishing a “Black Sea Union” with prospects as an observer.
Bulgaria’s and Romania’s EU membership could strengthen the Black Sea region’s
institutional relations with the Union. Regional cooperation might also be an
approach to solving frozen conflicts, such as the Transnistrian or South Ossetian
conflicts, integrating the autonomies within a broader framework of cooperation.
4. Creating a transition agency
To support transition in the neighbouring countries, the European Union should
create an agency, which could offer financial and administrative support and might
be funded by EU member states and international financial institutions. The new
member states from Central Europe would contribute by bringing in their own
transition experiences, as well as their personal networks with other policy and
decision makers in the region. To bypass authoritarian regimes, the transition
agency should put particular emphasis on supporting civil society and regional
cooperation. Contrasting the bluntness of the ENP action plans, the transition
agency could react quickly and flexibly to sudden developments in the region
brought by through popular protests or changes in government policy.
5. Redefining Russia in Eastern Europe
With its shortcomings in European values, Russia can be a challenging partner for
the EU, but at the same time the Russian Federation is too important to neglect. It
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Create a win-win Situation
Building alliances
has significant impact on both frozen conflicts and energy cooperation with and
within the ENP countries. Creating a win-win situation should be an overall goal,
considering both the Russian interest in retaining influence on the neighbouring
countries, as well as the neighbouring countries’ aspirations towards European
values. The European Union should create a trilateral institutional framework,
which brings together the ENP countries, Russia and the EU institutions.
Furthermore one should also use Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe
and the OSCE as a platform for democratic dialogue.
Beyond the current state of affairs, the European Union should also help strength-
en Russia’s democratic orientation dedicated to becoming an attractive and reliable
partner for the ENP countries.
6. An alliance for a new Eastern policy
Decision making in a European Union with 25 and more member states requires
new approaches to alliance building. While a new Eastern policy finds particular
support among Central European member states, policymaking at the European
level requires support from the old member states, as well, among them member
countries from Southern Europe. The traditional driving forces of Eastern policy are
called upon to promote the added value of stable and prosperous ENP countries
within Europe as a whole. The European institutions must identify whether the ENP
belongs to an “enlargement light”agenda or to the external relations of the EU. They
should act appropriately and assign primary ENP responsibility to the Council.
Offering the ENP countries attractive prospects will either be based on the current
agenda, signalling some progress but not implementing Europe’s interest in strength-
ening security and stability beyond its borders, or it will require institutional reforms
in the European Union dedicated to an institutional framework for Europe as a
whole. Considering the current crisis of European integration, pressure for further
enlargement is a positive but so far not a realistic signal. To overcome the gap 
between the current half-hearted solution and ambiguous future prospects, the
ENP should reduce its shortcomings and put particular emphasis on future options
for institutional integration. Reforming the ENP to a large extent depends on the
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